The defensible privacy construction combines three guarantees. First, no extra package leakage: prove that every byte of a selected token is generated solely from a frozen allowed-leakage function, given declared side information and public configuration. Second, a token-specific risk certificate: before release, calculate or bound the optimal exact-recovery probability, conditional min-entropy, mutual information, and Bayes risk, plus identity and sensitive-attribute risks where relevant, and release only if the token passes a declared policy (for example, at least 100 compatible candidates and a posterior exact-recovery probability no greater than 1 percent). Candidate count alone is insufficient under a concentrated prior, so both multiplicity and posterior risk must be certified. Third, held-out inference evidence: run reconstruction, identification, linkage, membership, and attribute attacks against the actual serialised artifact, compared with prior-only, metadata-only, full-token, and raw-data controls. For a prior-independent formal guarantee, a differentially private selected-disclosure mechanism would be added on top: fixed or privately selected preprocessing, clipping, calibrated random noise, sanitised metadata, and cumulative privacy accounting. The deterministic mechanism cannot provide nontrivial differential privacy by itself.